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Abstract
As the recent chain of EU sovereign crises has demonstrated, after an unexpected massive
rise to the debt GDP ratio, several EU countries manage to proceed with scal consolida-
tion quickly and e¤ectively, while other countries, notably Greece, proceed slowly, fuelling
Graccident and Grexit scenarios, even after generous rescue packages, involving debt
haircuts and monitoring from o¢ cial bodies. Here we recursively formulate a game among
rent-seeking groups and propose that high debt-GDP ratios lead to predictable miscoordina-
tion among rent-seeking groups, unsustainable debt dynamics, and open the path to political
accidents that foretell Graccidentscenarios. Our analysis and application helps in under-
standing the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for
scal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quanties
the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector
involvement in the case of Greece.
Keywords: sovereign debt, rent seeking, international lending, tragedy of the commons,
EU crisis, Grexit, Graccident
JEL classication: H63, F34, F36, G01, E44, E43, D72
1. Introduction
The Maastricht treaty has been explicit about two scal requirements in order to justify
participation in the Eurozone: (i) that the scal decit-GDP ratio never exceeds 3%, and
(ii) that the scal debt-GDP ratio never exceeds 60%. Here we investigate whether such
scal rules go beyond narrow-minded economic accounting. Specically, we examine whether
quotas on scal debt-GDP ratios guarantee the political feasibility of scal prudence once a
country is already member of a monetary union.
The two main ingredients of our politico-economic theory are, (i) the degree of corruption
in form of rent seeking, and (ii) the political separatism and political instability that may
be generated by excessive debt-GDP ratios. Focusing on countries with severe corruption
problems, with rent-seeking groups being connected to political parties, we seek conditions
that determine whether unexpected large shocks to scal debt can trigger a political process
of accidental bankruptcy and exclusion from sovereign markets.
Our focus on corruption can be empirically motivated by Figure 1. Figure 1 suggests that
corruption and scal proigacy correlate strongly across Eurozone countries, and corruption
is particularly acute in the EU periphery.1 The correlation displayed in Figure 1 admits
two interrelated interpretations that we examine in this paper. First, the interplay between
politics and corruption may be central to explaining the divergence of scal imbalances
between the EU core and EU periphery countries. Second, scal imbalances may reinforce
channels through which corrupt politics lead to excessive government debt, i.e., corruption
may lead to more corruption and eventually to an unsustainable level of government debt.
1 The correlation coe¢ cient between scal surplus/decit-GDP ratios and the corruption perception index
is 73%. Grechyna (2012) reports similar correlation results to this depicted by Figure 1, referring to OECD
countries. Figure 1 partly reects the sovereign debt shocks in EU countries, presented by Mendoza et
al. (2014, Figure 1). Using a crude interpretation of the correlation in Figure 1, with levels of corruption
comparable to Spain, Greeces budget decit over the the period 2005-2009 would have averaged as little as
2.5% of GDP rather than 6.5%.
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Our focus on the role of political separatism after a sovereign crisis has been motivated
by observing political instability incidents during the European debt crisis.2 Institutions
behind rescue packages, and notably the IMF, emphasized the need for political cooperation
and consensus among political parties in order to implement necessary scal-consolidation
for exiting the sovereign crisis.3
The channel we explore is whether outstanding debt-GDP ratios a¤ect practices of well-
organized rent-seeking groups within partisan politics that seek scal rents. In particular,
we investigate whether debt-GDP ratios provide incentives to rent-seeking groups to coop-
erate (or not) in order to comply with scal-prudence practices. One goal of our analysis is
to understand more about the policy prescription for sovereign-crisis problems that involve
politics more heavily than usual.4 As in the Lehman-Brothers nancial crisis, which had not
been pre-calculated by markets, we theoretically examine political events after an unantici-
pated shock on scal debt. Specically, we provide a model for understanding safety zones
for debt-to-GDP ratios. Depending on the size of the unanticipated scal shock and on scal
exposure, a country can either, (i) sustain a sudden rise of debt-GDP ratio, bearing welfare
2 Southern European countries and Ireland received nancial assistance from the Troikainstitutions (Eu-
ropean Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF) in an e¤ort to stabilise investment markets and
to bring political consensus on scal consolidation. In some cases rescue packages were followed by more
rather than less political instability, while fears about the future of these countries in the European Union
have not subsided. Greece is perhaps the most vivid example of political instability. Since 2010, Greece
has held ve elections forming four (one coalition and three single party) short-lived governments and one
interim technocrat government leading to the May 2012 election. The last double election held in January
2015 and September 2015 has again highlighted the deep political separatism and unwillingness of the ma-
jor political parties to cooperate in a coalition government that would help in sharing the political cost of
continued scal consolidation. Portugal is another example when just after the October 2015 election the
socialist partner withdrew the support from the coalition government.
3 Appendix A demonstrates this empasis of the IMF. In Appendix A we list excerpts from IMF country
reports which refer to Eurozone countries that either received rescue packages or faced excessively high
10-year government bond spreads during the sovereign crisis and were forced out of the bond markets.
4 For example, Greeces commitment to the common currency gives a stronger role to politics, requiring from
politicians of di¤erent parties to collaborate on strong reforms and on internal devaluation policies in order
to avoid disorderly default (the so-called Graccident) and sudden exit from the Eurozone (the so-called
Grexit, discussed extensively by Sinn, 2015) as well as to restore Greeces competitive edge (see Ioannides
and Pissarides (2015)).
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implications only, as debt can be rolled over, but with higher cost of servicing it, or, (ii) have
a political accident with long-term e¤ects, leading the country to accidental bankruptcy and
to exclusion from international nancial markets, to more corruption, and to higher scal
burdens due to corruption.
1.1 Illustrating the mechanics of the model
At the heart of our analysis is a dynamic game played by rent-seeking groups.5 This game
is embedded in an open economy with the following features: (i) rent-seeking groups jointly
inuence debt dynamics, government spending, and taxes through (non)cooperation deci-
sions, while extracting rents from the scal budget and, (ii) interest rates are determined in
international markets where foreign creditors buy government debt.
Rent seeker 2
C NC
Rent C
 
V C1 ; V
C
2
  
V NC1 ; V
NC
2

seeker 1 NC
 
V NC1 ; V
NC
2
  
V NC1 ; V
NC
2

Table 1
Consider the static snapshot (displayed in Table 1) of the game between two rent seeking
groups. The game species payo¤ values V Ci ; V
NC
i , i = 1; 2; from the strategies cooperation
Cand noncooperation NCrespectively. There are two possibilities for the equilibrium
of the game. If V Ci < V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g, then there are three Nash equilibria, (NC;NC),
(C;NC) and (NC;C), i.e., if noncooperation is more rewarding for both rent seekers, then
5 Our setup extends the formulation suggested by Persson (1998), who studies political competition among
rent-seeking groups which consume within-group club goods. This setup is related to the political economy
of rent-seeking (special-interest) groups, pioneered by Schattschneider (1935), Tullock (1959), Olson (1965),
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), Becker (1983, 1985), and Taylor (1987).
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noncooperation and separatism is a sure outcome. If, instead, V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g, then
there are two Nash equilibria, namely, (C;C) and (NC;NC), i.e., if cooperation is more
rewarding for both rent seekers, then cooperation becomes a possible outcome.
A key role in shaping the inequality above is played by a threshold value of the initial out-
standing debt-GDP ratio. Above that debt-GDP-ratio threshold, servicing the debt becomes
too costly. Rent-seeking groups foresee the consequences of noncooperation and separatism:
permanent non-cooperation in turn implies that no creditor is willing to lend money to the
country in question, with the latter resorting to nancial autarky forever after. Despite the
costs of this outcome, rent-seekers still have less to lose by not accessing markets and not
sharing rents, compared to sharing rents and servicing the high debt.
A tragedy of the commons problem, as explained in Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp.
163-164), is responsible for this market-isolation result. Without permanent cooperation of
rent-seeking groups, there is excessive debt issuing, a type of endogenous scal impatience.
This impatience causes a mismatch between creditors and a government, the former requiring
excessively high interest rates that make debt servicing infeasible.
Nevertheless, such a market exclusion outcome can be avoided if creditors and the groups
can both sign a binding commitment. Such a commitment exchanges debt relief for perma-
nent cooperation, with the size of the debt relief given by the distance between the outstand-
ing and threshold debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal consolidations can thus be more rewarding and
hence politically feasible if they are accompanied by some form of debt relief. A key con-
tribution of our study is the endogenous derivation of the threshold debt-GDP ratio that
encourages cooperation and can thus support the political sustainability of scal consolida-
tions. We think that deriving this debt-GDP-ratio threshold requires forward-lookingness, so
we provide a recursive formulation with potential applicability to existing dynamic stochastic
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macroeconomic frameworks in future extensions.
Our recursive formulation contributes an analytically solved deterministic model which
falls in Laguno¤s (2009, p. 577) specic class of politicoeconomic games. These games are
a collection of, (i) economic primitives, (ii) political rules, and (iii) initial conditions. The
political rules we study are Markovian decisions of rent-seeking groups to cooperate (or not)
on scal prudence, while the key initial condition that matters in our analysis is the initial
debt-GDP ratio.6 Our analysis is able to shed light on issues related to the recent sovereign
crisis in the Eurozone, specically on the desirability and politically feasibility of bailouts
and scal consolidations, which is the core application in this paper.7
1.2 Application
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Greek experience is the best example of all the models mechanics
at work. Hence the focus and motivation of the model application are the debt rescues that
began with the rst Greek bailout in May 2010 (followed by Portugal, Ireland) and two
further Greek bailout deals in 2012 and 2015. A quantitative exercise indicates that the
threshold debt-GDP ratio that encourages cooperation and can thus be thought as the
politically sustainable level is 137%. The model implies that a one-o¤ extrinsic-uncertainty
sunspot event hitting scal debt and taking debt-GDP ratio above this threshold, puts
the country in question in a danger zone of a political accident. The political accident is
6 In an inuential paper, Battaglini and Coate (2008) introduce political competition over pork-barrel spend-
ing in a tax smoothing model and study the e¤ect of debt on the composition of spending. While our model
is similar in spirit to theirs (i.e. redistribution using debt and taxes as instruments) there are two di¤er-
ences. First, Battaglini and Coate (2008) adopt the legislative bargaining approach while we use a dynamic
common pool resource approach. Second, a key di¤erence is that we endogenize the interest rate on debt,
which is assumed to be constant in Battaglini and Coate (2008). Consequently, the e¤ect of interest rates
on the dynamics of debt is a key channel, that a¤ects the political decisions in our framework.
7 Our model focuses on a setup in which there is a common currency between a domestic economy and foreign
creditors, which is directly applied to the Eurozone case. Yet, our model could be modied to including a
currency, in order to study the possibility of a currency crisis, potentially combined with a sovereign default
as well.
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a disorderly default, due to that rent-seeking groups foresee the cost of servicing the debt
exceeding the benets from extracting cooperative rents under a policy of scal prudence.8
Greece irted with a disorderly default (a Graccident) twice. The rst episode took
place for much of the second half of 2011 and early 2012, leading eventually in March/April
2012 to a debt swap with the private sector (the so called PSI), writing o¤ approximately
53% of bonds held by private creditors. The second event occurred in June-July 2015
when the newly elected left-wing Greek government missed scheduled payments to the IMF,
while negotiating with EU partners the conditions of a new consolidation program. Even
though we view 137% as an indicative threshold, the outstanding Greek debt-GDP ratio was
substantially higher in both episodes, reaching 163% in 2012 and 177% by mid 2015.
Default in the model can be best thought of as accidental default, i.e., the outcome of a
political separatism that results when the debt-GDP ratio is in a danger zone as explained
above. The default concept is thus di¤erent from a strategic-default choice by a government
in power as is most commonly encountered in the sovereign-debt literature.9 Our model is
best designed to study EU countries who are tightly connected through institutions, such
as the ECB, the Euro-parliament, Eurogroup, European commission and even NATO agree-
ments and where most of the EU debt is held by nancial institutions within the union. A
strategic default choice, implies an exit from the union and is thus incompatible with the
institutional constraints adopted by member countries.10
Pappa et al. (2015) estimate, using a New Keynesian model, the scal multiplier in
8 Extrinsic, or in the language of King (2016), radical uncertainty implies, neither the creditors, nor rent
seeking groups are able to see or expect one-o¤ events (akin to sunspots) that hit the debt-GDP ratio.
9 This alternative literature of strategic default is vast, pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow
and Rogo¤ (1989), Cole and Kehoe (1995), Cole et al. (1995). Extensions of this literature include Beetsma
and Uhlig (1999), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Arellano (2008), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Yue (2010), Roch
and Uhlig (2011), Amador (2012), and Mendoza and Yue (2012) among others. For an extensive review on
sovereign debt see Aguiar and Amador (2014).
10However we do not rule out that default threats may have played a role in the negotiations leading to the
third bailout deal reached by EU partners and Greece in July 2015.
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the presence of corruption and tax evasion in EU periphery countries and show that scal
consolidations are more costly in terms of output losses and welfare. Their empirical results
thus corroborate our analysis since they suggest that the presence of corruption makes the
debt burden in relation to GDP heavier for the economy undergoing the scal consolidation.
Insights on the determinants of such debt-GDP-ratio threshold levels help in understand-
ing the design of bailout rescue packages.11 A binding commitment for a debt haircut tries to
exclude an equilibrium in which rent-seeking groups would want to swing to noncooperation
even for one period. Securing that debt-GDP ratios stay below such threshold levels may
contribute to the politicoeconomic sustainability of debt. We also nd that international
agreements (among foreign governments or by the IMF) to roll over scal debt using lower
pre-agreed interest rates, increase the debt-GDP-ratio threshold levels that support coop-
eration. For instance, the 137% debt-GDP threshold discussed above rises to 160% if the
interest rate falls from 2.5% to 2%. Indeed, one feature of bailout plans in the Eurozone
is the tool of lowering interest rates. Our analysis thus suggests lower interest rates fos-
ter political cooperation among rent-seeking groups. They make rescue packages politically
feasible (and socially desirable) even at high outstanding debt-GDP ratios since they imply
lower taxes and higher public consumption increasing welfare for the general public. Our
models mechanics are compatible with these features, which perhaps explain the stated ra-
tionale behind bailouts: the need to make the servicing costs of debt socially and politically
bearable.
11In our Online Appendix we provide evidence on observations motivating us to suggest that corruption and
rent-seeking, as endemic problems in Eurozone periphery countries, play a central role as both causes and
e¤ects within the vicious circle of the Eurozone sovereign crisis.
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2. Model
2.1 The domestic economy
The domestic economy is populated by a large number of identical innitely-lived agents of
total mass equal to 1.
2.1.1 Production
A single composite consumable good is produced under perfect competition, using labor as
its only input through the linear technology,
yt = zt  lt , (1)
in which y is units of output, l is labor hours, and z is productivity. Assume that there is no
uncertainty and that productivity at time 0 is z0 > 0, growing exogenously at rate , i.e.,
zt = (1 + )
tz0 . (2)
2.1.2 Non rent-seeking households
A representative non rent-seeking household (one among a large number of such households)
draws utility from private consumption, c, leisure, 1   l, and also from the consumption of
a public good, G, maximizing the life-time utility function
1X
t=0
t [ln (ct) + l ln (1  lt) + G ln (Gt)] , (3)
in which  2 (0; 1) is the utility discount factor, while l; G > 0 are the weights on leisure
and public consumption, G, in the utility function. Public consumption is nanced via both
income taxes and scal debt. Yet, for simplicity, we assume that agents in this economy
cannot hold any government bonds, so scal debt is external in all periods. Finally, we
assume that agents cannot have access to domestic government bonds in the future, and
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that there is no storage technology. Under these assumptions, the budget constraint of an
individual household is,
ct = (1   t) ztlt . (4)
The representative non-rent-seeking household maximizes its lifetime utility given by
(3), subject to equation (4), by choosing the optimal stream of consumption and labor
supply, (f(ct; lt)g1t=0), subject to any given stream of tax rates and public-good quantities,
f(Gt;  t)g1t=0. Since the solution to this problem is based on intra-temporal conditions only,
we obtain a simple formula, namely,
lt =
1
1 + l
= L , t = 0; 1; ::: , (5)
with L being both the individual and the aggregate labor supply.12
2.1.3 Rent-seeking groups and rent-seeking households
We introduce N rent-seeking groups in the domestic economy that may be heterogeneous
in size. Total population in the economy has normalized size 1, and the population mass
of each rent-seeking group is j, j 2 f1; :::; Ng, with
PN
j=1 j  1. These groups have the
power to expropriate resources from the scal budget. In each period t 2 f0; 1; :::g, a rent-
seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng manages to extract a total rent of size CRj;t. Changing slightly
the formulation of Persson (1998), CRj;t is a composite club good subject to rivalness (public
good within but with congestion). Examples of components of CRj;t are civil-servant jobs for
which devoted group members can put less e¤ort at work, tax evasion for which the group
supports a network of non-transparency which is exclusive for group members, preferential
legal treatment, privileges regarding the management of real estate, scal overinvoicing, or
wasteful public infrastructure related to private benets, etc. These goods, CRj;t, are equally
12Under logarithmic utility the income and substitution e¤ects of taxation on leisure cancel each other out,
so labor supply does not respond to changes in marginal tax rates.
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available to every member of rent-seeking group j (every member of the group is the same),
but with each member taking advantage from a smaller club size.13 In each rent-seeking
group there is a large number of individuals, with each individual being unable to inuence
the groups aggregate actions.14 Denoting by CRj;t the individual members consumption of
the club good CRj;t, the utility function of an individual rent seeker belonging to group j is,
15
1X
t=0
t

ln(cj;t) + l ln(1  lj;t) + G ln(Gt) + R ln
 
CRj;t

, (6)
with R > 0, and her economic problem is maximizing (6) subject to the budget constraint
cj;t = (1   t) ztlj;t . (7)
Optimal choices for a rent seeker are given by,
lj;t = lt =
1
1 + l
= L , t = 0; 1; ::: . (8)
Since labor supply is identical across rent seekers and non rent seekers, private consumption
is also the same across rent seekers and non rent seekers, namely,
cj;t = ct = (1   t) ztL . (9)
2.1.4 Aggregate production and scal budget
Combining L with (1) and (2) gives the competitive-equilibrium GDP level,
Yt = (1 + )
t z0L . (10)
13On club goods see Mueller (2003, Chapter 9), and especially Sandler and Tschirhart (1997), and Roberts
(1999, Section 6), in which club goods with congestion are studied.
14Nevertheless, club strategies are fully compatible with individual-member incentives. We assume that even
if rent-seeking groups have to lobby, this is a costless collective action: it requires no individual e¤ort or any
other sacrice.
15For the formulation of the utility function see, for example, Sandler and Tschirhart (1997, eq. 1, p. 339).
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For simplicity, we assume that the domestic government issues only one-period zero coupon
bonds. So, in every period there is a need for full debt rollover to the next period.16 The
governments budget constraint is,
Bt+1
1 + rt+1
= Bt +Gt +
NX
j=1
!jC
R
j;t    tYt , (11)
in which the weight !j = Nj=
PN
i=1 i, Bt+1 is the value of newly issued bonds in period
t that mature in period t + 1, evaluated in terms of the consumable good in period t + 1,
and rt+1 is the interest rate which reects the intrinsic return of a bond maturing in period
t+ 1. Assuming that the one-period zero-coupon bond delivers one unit of the consumable
good at maturity, Bt reects the quantity of bonds maturing in period t. The weights !j
in equation (11) play the role of an e¢ ciency factor, transforming and mapping each dollar
extracted by the scal budget into goods enjoyed by each member of group j.17 Specically,
given that CRj;t is an individual members consumption of the total rents extracted by group
j, CRj;t, the relationship between C
R
j;t and C
R
j;t is given by,
CRj;t = !jC
R
j;t , for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng , t 2 f0; 1; :::g .
The smaller the size of group j, the smaller the weight !j, which means more special goods
CRj for each member of j. If all groups have the same size (i = j =  for all i; j 2 f1; :::Ng,
the symmetric-equilibrium case), then !j = 1 for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng. So, by convention, the
price per unit of CRj;t equals the consumer-basket price.
18 In the case of heterogeneity in
16This assumption of issuing exclusively one-year zero-coupon bonds rules out concerns about strategic
supply of bonds with di¤erent maturity. The short maturity time of bonds does not a¤ect our qualitative
results.
17For the formulation of weights !j in the scal budget constraint (11), see, for example, Sandler and
Tschirhart (1997, eq. 5, p. 341), which is based on the more general formulation of McGuire (1974),
adapted for a continuum of agents within the group, and assuming a constant within-group congestion cost.
18We follow this convention as it is not straightforward to impose a market price on such special-interest club
goods. Nevertheless, our equilibrium which emphasizes politicoeconomic ine¢ ciencies, uncovers the e¤ects
and costs of providing such rents.
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group size, weights !j a¤ect the rent-seeking-strategy incentives that each group member
promotes, by taking into account that in larger groups there is a smaller portion of goods
enjoyed per group member.
2.1.5 Impact of tax rates on GDP performance versus impact of
tax rates on welfare
The absence of any marginal tax rates in equation (10) demonstrates that our logarithmic-
utility setup neutralizes the impact of taxes on GDP performance and rules out dynamic
La¤er curves. While taxes do not a¤ect GDP performance, they directly reduce consumption
and utility (see equation (4)). So, taxes have a profound impact on welfare. Also, despite
that taxes do not have the classic distortionary e¤ects on GDP performance, our analysis
does not rule out considerations about an economys ability to repay scal debt. As it will
be clear later, international interest rates at which a country borrows externally, inuence
its ability to repay scal debt in the future. It is an analytical advantage that our model
clearly distinguishes the impact of interest-rate pressure on the ability to repay from other
factors a¤ecting GDP performance.
2.1.6 Policy-setting mechanism: the biggest part of society inu-
ences policy all the time
The levels of scal spending, Gt, the tax rate,  t, and the level of debt one period ahead
Bt+1, are the Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game among rent-seeking groups, which also
determines CRj;t in each period. We assume that
1 
XN
j=1
j| {z }
non rent-seekers
< min

j
	N
j=1| {z }
smallest rent-seeking group
, (12)
so non rent-seekers cannot beat any rent-seeking group in a majority-voting equilibrium on
these policy variables. For simplicity, we assume that all existing rent-seeking groups actively
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and simultaneously inuence policymaking in each period, while they determine their per-
member rent allocation

CRj
	N
j=1
. The allocation of rents,

CRj
	N
j=1
, is determined in a com-
petitive and decentralized way, through time-consistent Nash equilibrium. The tax rate and
the debt level are determined jointly through a simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium among
rent-seeking groups, as in legislative bargaining models or as in dynamic games in which
di¤erent players jointly manage common-pool resources. Our Nash equilibrium concept syn-
chronizes actions by rent-seeking groups, simplifying recursive formulations, implying that
all tax/debt policies are time-consistent. The qualitative equivalence of asynchronous scal
proigacy to a commons problem with simultaneous moves is demonstrated by Persson and
Svensson (1989). Yet, such an extension should not alter our results.19
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 7), present a number of applications related to
the political mechanism behind the provision of club goods as rents, such as legislative
bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition. Here we abstract from such an analysis
since EU core/periphery countries do not di¤er with respect to institutional arrangements
behind these political-economy extensions. As Figure 1 illustrates, the EU core/periphery
countries di¤er mostly with respect to the intensity of rent-seeking/corruption.
2.2 The external creditors
We denote all external-creditor variables using a star. Creditors hold one-period zero-coupon
bonds from M di¤erent countries. Creditors can be interpreted as managers of nancial
19We do not model alternating political parties and associated rent-seeking groups in power, as this would
complicate the derivation of equilibrium without adding insights to the model. Having all rent-seeking groups
acting simultaneously conveys the mechanics of a commons problem adequately: a rent-seeking group tends
to expropriate extra rents before being crowded out by extra rents of other groups. On the one hand, each
group fully internalizes the benets of its own per-member rent-seeking good, CRj . On the other hand,
because nancing is shared among groups, each group internalizes only one fraction of the social burden
caused by higher taxes and debt. Extensions of our model employing numerical techniques may explore the
role of alternating incumbent parties that are controled by rent-seeking groups. Such extensions are beyond
the scope of our analysis here, which is based on closed-form solutions.
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institutions who act in the best interest of the shareholders. Given an initial portfolio
of bonds from di¤erent countries,

Bi;0
	M
i=1
they select
n
ct ;

Bi;t
	M
i=1
o1
t=0
in order to
maximize the total life-time utility of (credit-institution) shareholders given by,
1X
t=0
t ln (ct ) (13)
subject to the budget constraint,
MX
i=1
PBi;tB

i;t+1 =
MX
i=1
Bi;t   ct , (14)
in which PBi;t = 1= (1 + ri;t+1) is the price of a bond that matures in period t+1. Notice also
that the rate of time preference, (1  ) =, in the utility function of creditors, (13), is equal
to the rate of time preference of domestic households. For maximizing (13) subject to (14),
a requirement for Bi;t > 0 for all i 2 f1; :::;Mg is,
PBi;t = P
B
j;t =
1
1 + rt+1
, t = 0; 1; ::: . (15)
The solution to the problem of maximizing (13) subject to (14) is,
ct = (1  ) Bt , cs = (1  ) s t
sY
j=t+1
(1 + rj) B

s , s = t+ 1; t+ 2; ::: ,
which implies,
Bt+1 =  (1 + rt+1) B

t , with B

t 
MX
i=1
Bi;t , t = 0; 1; ::: . (16)
Logarithmic preferences are responsible for this compact algebraic solution given by (16),
which implies that demand for external debt depends only on the return of bonds issued in
period t and maturing in period t+ 1, rt+1.20
20Without logarithmic utility, the typical decision rule determining the demand of bonds in period 1 is of
the form Bt+1 = h
 frsg1s=t+1 ; Bt , i.e., it depends on all future interest rates, frsg1s=t+1. In the special case
of logarithmic utility, h is of the more restricted form h
 frsg1s=t+1 ; Bt  = ~h (rt+1; Bt ) =  (1 + rt+1)Bt .
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2.3 Bond Demand by Creditors
Let a set of weights fmi;tgMi=1, such that,
Bi;t = mi;t B

t , i = 1; :::;M , with
MX
i=1
mi;t = 1 . (17)
Combining (17) with (16) gives,
Bi;t+1 =  (1 + rt+1)
mi;t+1
mi;t
Bi;t (18)
Equation (18) determines the demand for bonds by external creditors for each country in
period t+ 1, and fmi;t+1gMi=1, is determined by market-clearing conditions which depend on
bond supply by each country.
2.4 Bond Supply by the Domestic Economy Conditional Upon
Cooperation Decisions
In Appendix B, Proposition 1.B, we derive political decisions according to a Markov-perfect
non-cooperative equilibrium for a given stream of interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, the choices of
club rents, CRj;t, and public policies Bt+1, Gt, and  t. These decisions are conditional upon
(non-)cooperation decisions, distinguished in two categories: (i) a case of cooperation among
rent-seeking groups, which is captured by setting N = 1 in the formulas below, and (ii) a
case of non-cooperation without partial coalitions among groups. The bond-supply equation
from Proposition 1.B is,
Bt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
264NBt + (1  N) ztW  frsg1s=t+1| {z }
Economys worth
  Yt
375 , (19)
That ~h (rt+1; Bt ) is independent from any interest-rate changes in the continuation stream frsg1s=t+2 does
not mean that creditors with logarithmic preferences are not forward-looking any more. It is that income-
and substitution e¤ects on consumption/savings cancel each other out one-to-one, for all future transition
paths under logarithmic utility. So, under (13), the e¤ects of any continuation stream frsg1s=t+2 only reect
the impact of the constant rate of time preference on current decisions, through the presence of the discount
factor, , in ~h (rt+1; Bt ) =  (1 + rt+1)B

t .
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in which,
W
 frsg1s=t+1 =
2664 1Y
s=t+1
1
1 + ~rs
+ 1 +
1X
s=t+1
1
sQ
j=t+1
(1 + ~rj)
3775  L , 1 + ~rt  1 + rt1 +  , (20)
with,
N =
1
1 + (N   1) (1 )R
1+G+R
 . (21)
2.5 Determining interest rates in international markets
Combining equation (19) with (18) in order to equate B{^;t = Bt for all t (assume {^ is
the domestic economy), leads to interest-rate determination in international equilibrium
through the aid of equation (20). Equation (21) provides a crucial di¤erence depending
on whether rent-seeking groups cooperate or not. In case of cooperation, (21) implies that
N jN=1 = . In case of no cooperation, N < , a case of collective impatience. This
collective-impatience mechanism is crucial for understanding the tragedy-of-the-commons
mechanism and this mechanism is a key element for understanding cooperation decisions.21
The recursive-equilibrium concept for endogenizing these cooperation decisions follows in
the next section.
2.6 Denition of Markov-perfect-cooperation-decision Nash equi-
librium (MPCDNE)
Let the cooperation decision of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng be denoted by the indicator
function
Ij;t =
8><>: 1 ;0 ;
j plays cooperatein period t
j plays do not cooperatein period t
.
21With endogenous cooperation decisions among rent-seeking groups, formula (18) which governs the dy-
namics of Bt is still valid: in an equilibrium with some periods of cooperation and some periods without
cooperation, N in equation (18) becomes a convex combination of  and N from equation (21).
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Let the rent-consumption strategies in periods of no cooperation be denoted by CR;NCj for
all j 2 f1; :::; Ng. Let
S 
n
CR;NCi ; Ii
oN
i=1
,
Dene the Bellman equation related to determining the value of a cooperation decision in
the current period,
V C;j (B; z j S) = max
(;CR;C ;B0)
(
ln (zL) + ln (1  ) + l ln (1  L) + R ln

CR;C
N

+ G ln

B0
1 +R (B; z j S)  
 
B + CR;C   zL
+ 
8<:
NY
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)V C;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)| {z }
future value from cooperation
+
"
1 
NY
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
#
V NC;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)| {z }
future value from non-cooperation
9=;
9=; , (22)
where, CR;C denotes cooperative rents that are shared equally among all rent-seeking groups,
R (B; z j S) denotes the interest rate on debt, and a prime denotes the next period value of
the corresponding variable. Further, the Bellman equation that determines the value of a
noncooperation decision in the current period is,
V NC;j (B; z j S) = max
(;cR;NCj ;B0)
(
ln (zL) + ln (1  ) + l ln (1  L) + R ln

cR;NCj

+ G ln
264 B0
1 +R (B; z j S)  
0B@B + cR;NCj + NX
i=1
i6=j
CR;NCi (B; z j S)  zL
1CA
375
+ 
(
NY
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)V C;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
+
"
1 
NY
i=1
Ii (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
#
V NC;j (B0; (1 + ) z j S)
))
. (23)
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where, cR;NCj denotes non-cooperative rents shared among members of group j.
Denition 1 focuses on global cooperation among N rent-seeking groups, excluding coop-
erating subcoalitions. In the application of this paper we focus on a symmetric equilibrium
of the case with N = 2, i.e., subcoalitions are ruled out.
Denition 1 AMarkov-Perfect-Cooperation-Decision Nash Equilibrium (MPCDNE)
is a set of strategies, S 
n
CR;NCi ; Ii
oN
i=1
of the form CR;NCi;t = C
R;NC
i (Bt; zt j S)
Ii;t = Ii (Bt; zt j S) with
Ii (Bt; zt j S) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1 ;
0 ;
if V C;j (B; z j S)  V NC;j (B; z j S) and
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 1
if V C;j (B; z j S) < V NC;j (B; z j S) and
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 1 ,
or if
NQ
j=1
j 6=i
Ij (Bt; zt j S) = 0
and a set of policy decision rules (T;G;B) of the form,
 t = T (Bt; zt j S) =
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)TC (Bt; zt j S)
+
"
1 
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)
#
TNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt j S) =
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)BC (Bt; zt j S)
+
"
1 
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)
#
BNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
Gt = G (Bt; zt j S) =
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)GC (Bt; zt j S)
+
"
1 
NY
i=1
Ii (Bt; zt j S)
#
GNC (Bt; zt j S) ,
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a bond-demand strategy of creditors, Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt j S), such that

TNC ;BNC ;CR;NCj ;GNC

guarantee that each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng solves the Bell-
man equation given by (23),
 
TC ;BC ;CR;C ;GC

solves the Bellman equation
given by (22), creditorsBcomplies with equation (18), and with R (Bt; zt j S) =
rt+1 satisfying B (Bt; zt j S) = B (Bt; zt j S), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
2.7 International Equilibrium Conditional Upon Cooperation De-
cisions
We study two international equilibria. A cooperation equilibrium with rent-seeking groups
agreeing upon scal policy and sharing rents from the scal budget, and a non-cooperation
equilibrium with rent-seeking groups ghting over scal rents and consequently over extract
rents from that budget. The resulting scal policies (over debt, taxes and public goods) are
very di¤erent in those two cases and so is the path of interest rates that clear the international
debt market.
Cooperation. We examine the case in which N  2 rent-seeking groups cooperate by
forming a single government coalition comprised by all existing rent-seeking groups in the
economy (universal coalition). Within this universal coalition, rent-seeking groups equally
share a total amount of rents, CRt , with each group member receiving C
R
t =
PN
j=1 !j =
CRt =N
in each period.22 We derive the supply of bonds decided by such a coalition and we equate
it to the demand for bonds by external creditors in order to calculate international interest
rates.
22Notice that although rent-seeking groups may be heterogeneous in size (i 6= j for some i 6= j), under
cooperation each rent-seeking group member will end up consuming the same per-capita amount from the
broad-coalition club good.
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The Bellman equation of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng under cooperation is given by,
V C;j (Bt; zt) = max
( t; CRt ;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+G ln

Bt+1
1 +RC (Bt; zt)
   Bt + CRt    tYt + R ln CRtN

+V C;j (Bt+1; (1 + ) zt)
9>=>; , (24)
in which the interest-rate rule, rt+1 = RC (Bt; zt), is determined by equating supply and
demand in the international market for bonds. Due to the symmetry of rent-seeking groups
there is unanimity within the universal coalition. Denition 2, which is a special case of
Denition 1, species international-market equilibrium under cooperation of rent-seeking
groups.
Denition 2 An International Equilibrium under Cooperation (IEC) is a set
of strategies, CR;C of the form CR;Ct = CR;C (Bt; zt) and a set of policy deci-
sion rules

TC ;GC ;BC
	
of the form  t = TC (Bt; zt), Gt = GC (Bt; zt), and
Bt+1 = BC (Bt; zt), a bond-demand strategy of creditors, Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt), and
an interest-rate rule, RC (Bt; zt), such that

TC ;BC ;CR;C ;GC
	
guarantee that
each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (24), subject to rule
RC (Bt; zt), creditorsBcomplies with equation (18), and with RC (Bt; zt) = rt+1
satisfying BC (Bt; zt) = B (Bt; zt), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
Proposition 1 characterizes the rent-seeking political equilibrium under cooperation among
rent-seeking groups (IEC).
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Proposition 1 Assuming that all debtor countries follow an IEC path, for all
t 2 f0; 1; :::g, the IEC interest rates are constant, given by,
RC (Bt; zt) = r
ss =
1 + 

  1 , t = 0; 1; ::: , (25)
the debt-GDP ratio remains constant over time,
BC (Bt; zt)
Yt
=
Bt
Yt
 bCt = b0 
B0
Y0
, t = 0; 1; ::: , (26)
the public-consumption-to-GDP ratio, the rents-to-GDP ratio, and the tax rate,
all remain constant over time, with,
GC (Bt; zt)
Yt
 gCt = gC =
(1  ) G
1 + G + R
26664 11  | {z }
Economys worth/GDP
  b0|{z}
Fiscal debt/GDP
37775 , t = 0; 1; ::: ,
(27)
CR;C (Bt; zt)
Yt
=
R
G
gC , and TC (Bt; zt) = Ct = C = 1 
1
G
gC , t = 0; 1; ::: .
(28)
Proof See Appendix B. 
Non-cooperation. In the case of no cooperation the Bellman equation of rent-seeking
group j 2 f1; :::; Ng is given by,
V NC;j
 
Bt; zt j
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
!
= max
( t;CRj;t;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+ G ln
264 Bt+1
1 +RNC (Bt; zt)
 
0B@Bt + !jCRj;t + NX
i=1
i6=j
!iCR;NCi (Bt; zt)   tYt
1CA
375
+R ln
 
CRj;t

+ V NC;j
 
Bt+1; (1 + ) zt j
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
!9>=>; (29)
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in which rt+1 = RNC (Bt; zt) is the interest-rate rule. Denition 3 species international-
market equilibrium under noncooperation of rent-seeking groups.
Denition 3 An International Equilibrium under No Cooperation (IENC)
is a set of strategies,
n
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
of the form CR;NCi;t = C
R;NC
i (Bt; zt) and a
set of policy decision rules

TNC ;GNC ;BNC
	
of the form  t = TNC (Bt; zt),
Gt = GNC (Bt; zt), and Bt+1 = BNC (Bt; zt), a bond-demand strategy of creditors,
Bt+1 = B (Bt; zt), and an interest-rate rule, RNC (Bt; zt), such that

TNC ;BNC ;CR;NC ;GNC
	
guarantee that each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (29),
subject to rule RNC (Bt; zt) and subject to strategies of other rent-seeking groupsn
CR;NCi
oN
i=1
i6=j
, creditors Bcomplies with equation (18), and with RNC (Bt; zt) =
rt+1 satisfying BNC (Bt; zt) = B (Bt; zt), for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
Proposition 2 conveys a crucial feature of our model.
Proposition 2 If N  2, there is no IENC equilibrium with B0 > 0, the
only possibility for IENC existence is nancial autarky, i.e.,B0 = 0. If, N  2,
and B0 > 0, are the initial conditions, then the only possible IENC as a market
outcome, is immediate exclusion from international credit markets without the
opportunity to return if debt renegotiation is not allowed.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 2 says that nancial autarky is the only Markov equilibrium without cooper-
ation. While the proof of Proposition 2 is extensive, the key behind this result is an endoge-
nous impatience mechanism that we explain in detail below. Specically, the endogenous
discount factor N , specied by equation (21) above, which implies @N=@N < 0, causes a
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mismatch in the market-clearing equation of external debt. External creditors foresee that
multiple rent-seeking groups have the tendency to issue debt excessively in all periods. So,
external creditors understand that the domestic economy will be unable to repay the debt
asymptotically and demand a sequence of high interest rates that oblige the domestic econ-
omy to provide its total worth to creditors asymptotically. So, if debt renegotiation is not
allowed, the domestic economy is excluded from international credit markets.
2.8 Inspecting the tragedy of the commons mechanism
2.8.1 The ability to repay debt and incentives for scal prudence
Equations (19)-(20) convey the scal-burden mechanism which is a key incentive for scal
prudence in this model. Next periods optimal debt-GDP ratio decreases if future interest
rates are foreseen to increase. Since @W
 frsg1s=t+1 =@rs < 0 for all s  t+1, equation (19)
implies that next periods debt-GDP ratio falls, because of the foreseen increase in rolling
over debt issued in the future. This increase in interest rates imposes a debt-servicing burden
that reduces the ability to repay.
2.8.2 Postponed scal prudence: scal impatience due to a com-
mons problem
Policy setting by multiple noncooperating rent-seeking groups has a profound e¤ect on post-
poning scal prudence. SinceW
 frsg1s=t+1 is multiplied by the factor (1  N),in equation
(19) and @ (1  N) =@N > 0 (see equation (21)), an increase in the number of rent-seeking
groups strengthens the scal-prudence-postponement characteristic. Postponement of scal
prudence stems from two opposing forces. On the one hand, rent-seeking groups want to
conserve the scal budget, in order to be able to extract more in the future. So, they exhibit
scal prudence by having the optimal next periods debt-GDP ratio strategy depending pos-
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itively on the termW
 frsg1s=t+1. On the other hand, as the number of rent-seeking groups
increases, scal debt is issued excessively today, a commons problem.
This commons problem is revealed by Proposition 1.B in Appendix B. For exogenous
interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, with CRj;t = CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

being the per-capita level of
club consumption by a member of rent-seeking group j, !jCRj;t is the total rents extracted
by group j. So, aggregate economy-wide rents are,
NX
i=1
!iCRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

=
=
N  (1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R| {z }
(N)
 ztW  frsg1s=t+1 Bt| {z }
Economys net worth
. (30)
The fraction of economys net worth expropriated by all rent-seeking groups is increasing in
the number of (symmetric) groups (0 (N) > 0 in equation (30)). Aggregate rents increase
in the number of rent-seeking groups because each noncooperating rent-seeking group ex-
propriates additional rents before being crowded out by other groups. This e¤ect, driven
by 0 (N) > 0, leads to collective scal impatience across rent-seeking groups that do not
cooperate, describing a classic commons problem, in a similar fashion to problems of resource
conservation. This commons problem dominates, and leads to scal-prudence postponement.
3. The threshold debt-GDP ratio fostering cooperation and im-
plications for sovereign rescue deals
The preceding analysis suggests that a positive debt level can be supported by an interna-
tional equilibrium when rent-seeking groups cooperate forever. In this section we take the
mechanics and intuition of the model and examine a bond renegotiation scheme that both
creditors and rent-seeking groups may be willing to accept. According to that scheme, cred-
itors are willing to o¤er a debt reduction in exchange for cooperation among rent seeking
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groups, leading to scal discipline. Our focus is inspired by the rescue packages received by
Greece at the early stages of the sovereign crisis, emphasizing the goal to avoid a disorderly
default, because of fears of domino e¤ectsand possible runs on nancial institutions and
governments of other troubled countries, such as Portugal and Spain.
In a monetary union the ability of each member state to issue and repay external scal
debt is crucial for the sustainability of a banking system in which foreign banks may play
the role of external creditors (EU banks are major buyers of sovereign debt issued by other
EU countries).23 While we do not model banks explicitly, we stress that an international
agreement about either, (a) entrance into a monetary union, or (b) a rescue package for
debt rollover of a member state, should guarantee that rent-seeking groups which tend to
act separately, have incentives to cooperate forever. Here we focus on (b), a rescue package
which aims at a particular agreement: that rent-seeking groups will commit to a non-default
and that they will be cooperating forever, sharing their rents.
Our analysis below can be executed for any N  2. We set N = 2 by convention through-
out the rest of this section, focusing on Greece, in which rent-seeking groups have been tra-
ditionally tied with two major political parties, the center/left-wingversus center/right-
wing. In addition, without loss of generality, we assume symmetry among groups, i.e., the
two groups are of the same size.
3.1 Two rent-seeking groups andMarkov-perfect-Nash-equilibrium
selection
Even in the one-stage, normal-form game of cooperation decisions, presented by Table 1 in
the Introduction, there are multiple Nash equilibria. If cooperation is less rewarding for both
players (V Ci < V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g), then a cooperation outcome is impossible. The only way
23Our formulation of external creditors reects that banks maximize the utility of foreign bank-equity holders.
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to make a cooperation outcome possible is to ensure that cooperation is more rewarding for
both players (V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g). A dynamic game with an innite horizon and a free
option to cooperate (or not) in each period can have multiple equilibria as well. In order to
obtain clearer results whenever V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g, we propose two equilibrium-selection
assumptions. We call the rst assumption a willingness renement, and the second a
separatistic loyalty renement. These assumptions facilitate having a clearer denition of
a debt-GDP ratio that determines whether V Ci > V
NC
i , i 2 f1; 2g.
3.1.1 The willingness renement mirroring international commit-
ments within a monetary union
Following Laguno¤ (2009), we restrict our attention to a self-selected dynamic politicoeco-
nomic mechanism of cooperation as explained by Denition 1. In Denition 1 the implicit
assumption is that whenever V Ci  V NCi , i 2 f1; 2g, then group i always chooses to co-
operate. We impose this equilibrium selection since a monetary union implies powerful
institutional commitments which we do not wish to model explicitly in this paper. Other
member states, which are not explicitly modeled here, would dislike scal imbalances and
would be inclined to punish countries that default due to lack of cooperation among rent-
seeking groups. Yet, other member states respect the unwillingness of a polity to comply
with a cooperative equilibrium, as long as this unwillingness is driven by fundamentals (even
if this polity is dominated by rent-seeking groups).
In the context of the Eurozone, a member state can exit the common currency after a
mandate based on a referendum. For example, a left-wing Greek government, elected on
January 2015, called such a referendum on June 26 2015, after a breakdown of negotiations
on a new bailout deal with European partners. We believe that this rule, of allowing exit
through a referendum, captures the idea that, in Denition 1, V Ci < V
NC
i for some i 2 f1; 2g,
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implies no cooperation (respecting unwillingness to cooperate), whereas V Ci  V NCi , i 2
f1; 2g, always implies cooperation (respecting Euro-area obligations based on utility-based
willingness to cooperate, which may be democratically expressed through a referendum).
Finally, another renement of having multiple equilibria in the case of V Ci  V NCi , i 2
f1; 2g, would be to assume i.i.d. randomizations, e.g.  times cooperation and 1   times
noncooperation. Such an analysis would still indicate a cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio level as a
function of .24
3.1.2 The separatistic loyalty renement
Table 1 illustrates that the strategies according to which two rent-seeking groups either, (i)
cooperate forever, or (ii) never cooperate and default, in which case they keep not cooperating
forever under a balanced scal budget, are both Markov-perfect cooperation-decision Nash
equilibria.25 As we explain in Section 3.3. below, a default in our model should be interpreted
as a political accident, that leads to the accidentaldefault outcome and does not relate to
the concept of strategic default used in the classic sovereign debt literature. We believe, this
interpretation is more appropriate for countries that are members of a monetary union, in
which countries commit to behave in a manner that does not threaten the nancial stability
of the union.
Lets start examining case (ii) above, i.e., default with no cooperation before and after-
wards. Moving one period ahead after the full default, debt remains 0 forever (see Proposition
2), and the game is not a dynamic game anymore, but similar to the normal-form game of
cooperation decisions, with the sole di¤erence that GDP grows exogenously and sums of
24We think that such a formulation would be ideal for studying an extension to our model without a currency
peg to the currency of external creditors (implied or forced by participation to a monetary union). This
extension could provide a tool for predicting long-term exchange-rate trends based on country corruption
indicators and outstanding debt-GDP ratios.
25A formal proof of this claim, that strategies (i) and (ii) are both Markov-perfect cooperation-decision
equilibriums, appears in the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
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discounted utilities over an innite horizon are computed. After some algebra, we nd that
V C;j (Bt = 0; zt) > V
NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
, 1 +  > 2 , (31)
j 2 f1; 2g in which,
  R
1 + G + R
. (32)
By its denition,  2 (0; 1), and it is straightforward to verify that 1 +  > 2 is a true
statement for all  2 (0; 1). So, V C;j (0; zt) > V NC;j (0; zt) for j 2 f1; 2g and all t 2
f1; 2; :::g. As we have noticed above for the normal-form game, whenever cooperation is
more rewarding for both players, there are two Nash equilibria, (C;C) and (NC;NC). So,
by the unimprovability principle (cf. Kreps 1990, pp. 812-813), the strategies described
by (ii) above, no cooperation in period 0, immediate default and no cooperation thereafter
forever, is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
We propose a renement: that after an accidental default the separatist (NC;NC) holds
forever. This renement adheres to the intuition that after dramatic events, separatist
sentiments prevail. One could also introduce an additively-separable penalty to any rent-
seeking-group member for suggesting to cooperate with other groups afterwards, in order
to reverse inequality (31), so that V C;j (0; zt) < V NC;j (0; zt) for j 2 f1; 2g and all t 2
f1; 2; :::g. This penalty, which is conditional upon a prior incident of accidental default,
justies separatistic loyalty, and strengthens this intuitive equilibrium selection. With or
without such a penalty, we recommend this renement in order to facilitate the analytics for
our application.
3.1.3 Debt-GDP threshold of separatism and accidental defaults
Having established that no cooperation and default is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium,
allows us to study a sovereign-debt rescue initiative in a monetary union more formally. In
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the spirit of the willingness renement discussed above, other member states may consider
no cooperation among rent-seeking groups and sovereign default as being the worst possible
outcome in a period of banking fragility. The reason is that default by a sovereign state may
be a big shock for banks holding external debt, both due to direct balance sheet losses and,
perhaps more importantly, contagion e¤ects within the union. Moreover, convincing rent-
seeking groups to follow a strategy of cooperation forever, in order to avoid the problems
of scal impatience and scal proigacy is the most desirable outcome from the perspective
of the unions sustainability. Proposition 3 establishes that this cooperation equilibrium
is a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, and it identies debt-to-GDP ratios that make its
adoption and enforceability desirable by two rent-seeking groups.
Proposition 3 If N = 2, then the strategies according to which the two rent-
seeking groups cooperate forever is a Markov-perfect cooperation-decision Nash
equilibrium, which holds if,
V C;j (Bt; zt)  V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
, bt  1
1  

1  2

1 + 

 b ,
(33)
for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, in which  is given by (32).
Proof See Appendix B. 
In Proposition 3 notice the converse of (33): if the debt-GDP ratio is higher than a
threshold level, b, then rent-seeking groups have higher utility by defaulting and not cooper-
ating ever after. This is reasonable, because paying back the debt and cooperating entails a
tradeo¤: on the one hand, rent-seeking groups can divide the coalition rents by two, which
leads to rewards in each period; on the other hand, they have to bear the cost of servicing
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the debt. The higher the debt-GDP ratio the lower the cooperation benets, so default and
non-cooperation gives a higher payo¤making default the unique Nash equilibrium.26 If b ac-
cidentally becomes higher than b, due to an unforeseen shock, then an accidental disorderly
default is unavoidable.
3.2 Model insights and extensions
Our model is deterministic and this simplifying aspect contributes to obtaining analytical
results. A way to interpret our models contribution is depicted by Figure 2. Figure 2 shows
that the threshold debt-GDP ratio, b, splits the space of initial conditions into two zones, a
white one of cooperation and no default, and a black one, of noncooperation and accidental
default (which is perhaps not far from the Graccident concept). The key simplifying
assumption is that no shock is anticipated by creditors or any rent-seeking group. So, in a
deterministic world, if initial conditions are in the white area of Figure 2, it is anticipated
that bt = b0 for all t. However, an accidental default can occur if there is an unexpected shock
(similar in spirit to the example employed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, p. 224)) to initial
conditions, e.g. an unexpected jump in GDP, Y0, which automatically makes b0 = B0=Y0 to
jump upwards.27
In our model, default is a Nash equilibrium in a deterministic framework after an un-
expected shock, in the sense that the possibility of such a shock is not internalized by the
creditors. For this reason, we do not include a default option in the action space of rent-
seeking groups in the spirit of DErasmo and Mendoza (2015) in which a single player in a
government may choose default strategically. Apparently this is a simplifying assumption
that o¤ers, however, useful insights for future extensions of our model. Such extensions
26However, the e¤ect for society that does not participate in rent-seeking groups is quite negative: this part
of society ends up paying higher taxes in order to nance increased rents due to non-cooperation.
27This is a form of extrinsic or radicaluncertainty (see King, 2016) can be seen as a sunspot altering initial
conditions, the sdebt stock in this case.
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would be accommodated in our recursive framework, by incorporating anticipated shocks
and would also require to include default in the strategy space of rent-seeking groups. In
that case, however, corner solutions and mixed-strategy equilibria would not allow for an-
alytical results and would require solving through numerical approaches. Our conjecture
is that stochastic versions of our model would give grey zonesof default, as depicted in
Figure 2. Specically, such grey zones would correspond to condence intervals of default
riskiness, since all variables are random in a stochastic model. We believe that this is an
exciting agenda for future research, especially if it is extended beyond rational expectations,
to learning about disaster risk, as in Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011).
3.3 Sovereign rescue packages
Monitoring the ability of a government to satisfy the conditions of a rescue package in-
volves preventing and eliminating excessive rent seeking by groups that inuence poli-
cymaking. This focus on controlling the behavior of partisan corruption is evident in
IMF-report excerpts outlined in Appendix A. EU rescue packages imply monitoring of the
domestic economys rent-seeking groups by other member states of the monetary union.
However, as illustrated by Proposition 3, it is reasonable to try to make the rescue deal
palatable to the rent-seeking groups in order to achieve political sustainability and ro-
bustness of the rescue-package deal. So, if bt is larger than the threshold given by (33),
b = [1  2= (1 + )] = (1  ), then the rescue-package deal may involve a sovereign-debt
haircut of magnitude 100  (bt   b) percentage points of the domestic economys GDP.
Another crucial aspect of rescue-package e¤ectiveness, is the welfare change for the gen-
eral public (non rent seekers). In our model, political outcomes, (Gt,  t, Bt+1), are deter-
mined solely by the Nash-equilibrium decisions of rent-seeking groups. Even after a default
that eliminates the burden of servicing the scal debt, non-rent-seekers prefer that rent-
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seeking groups cooperate. This happens because noncooperation implies higher total rents
extracted in the form of higher  , and welfare reduction through lower g  G=Y . Proposition
4 shows that gains from cooperation are substantial for non-rent-seekers. Specically, even
if bt > b, and an exogenous international agreement forces rent-seeking groups to cooperate
without a haircut that reduces bt to b, then non-rent-seekers would benet even if they had
to service the high debt bt > b thereafter.
Proposition 4 There exists a cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio,
b =
1
1  

1 + 
, (34)
in which  is given by (32), with b > b, such that, if gC
b^
corresponds to cooper-
ation among rent-seeking groups together with servicing b^ forever, and if gNCdefault
corresponds to full default and noncooperation forever, then,
(i) b^ 2  b;b) gC
b^
> gNCdefault , (35)
(ii) b^ > b) gC
b^
< gNCdefault . (36)
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 4 states that attempts to convince rent-seeking groups to cooperate (see the
relevant IMF-report excerpts in Appendix A) would be welcomed by the general non-rent-
seeking public if the debt-GDP ratio is not too high. Non-rent-seeking households dislike
excessive corruption that leads to scal proigacy, unless the outstanding debt GDP ratios
is exceptionally high.
3.4 Calibration
Our goal in this section is to quantify the threshold debt-GDP ratio b, that fosters coopera-
tion. Our calibration focuses on matching data from the EU periphery countries, since they
32
have been at the center of the EU crisis. First, we match the average total-government-to-
GDP spending which is approximately 45%.28 Second, we need to nd the target value
for the total-rents-GDP ratio at the threshold debt-GDP ratio b (denoted by CR). To do
this we use estimates regarding the size of the shadow economy as a share of GDP reported
by Elgin and Oztunali (2012). We make a simple projection of these shadow-economy esti-
mates, assuming that these shares are uniform across the private and the public sector. In
other words, the share of rents in total government spending match the size of the shadow
economy as a share of GDP.
CR;C as % of government spending threshold debt-GDP ratio b
28% (EU periphery) 137%
Table 2
In Table 2 we report the threshold debt-GDP ratio, b, corresponding to the 28% rents-to-
total-government spending ratio which is the average shadow economy share in EU-periphery
countries.29 The assumed rate of time preference, (1  ) =, is 2:4%. The 137% cuto¤ level
b provides higher utility to rent-seekers if they cooperate, compared to defaulting. Interest-
ingly, a 137% debt-GDP ratio is in the ballpark of targets of the private sector involvement
(PSI)haircut for Greece in the period 2011-2012.30 A key factor shaping the target debt-
GDP ratio of Greece during the PSI negotiations was the political sustainability of scal
prudence. According to the model prudence could be achieved by a coalition government, at
28Data for G=Y are from the European Central Bank (ECB), Statistical data Warehouse, Government
Finance data (Revenue, Expenditure and decit/surplus), September 2013. We take the average over the
period 1995 to 2012.
29So, the rents-GDP ratio is 28%  45% = 12:6% in this calibration. In Appendix B we explain how
calibration is achieved in this model. Specically, we prove that calibrating R and G in order to match
target values for the government-consumption-GDP ratio and the total-rents-GDP ratio is independent from
the values of  at the cuto¤ level b.
30For an extensive review of the Greek sovereign crisis and an outline of PSI see Ardagna and Caselli (2014).
For a study reporting the average haircut values between years 1970-2010, see Cruces and Trebesch (2012).
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least by the two major political parties that used to alternate in power during the previous
four decades, and in fact a broad based coalition government followed the PSI.
Figure 3 depicts a sensitivity analysis of our benchmark calibration. It shows the relation-
ship between the rate of time preference,  = (1  ) = and the cuto¤ level b. We emphasize
that varying  means simultaneously changing the rate of time preference of both creditors
and of all agents in the domestic economy. As Proposition 1 indicates, under cooperation,
international interest rates remain constant, tracking closely the rate of time preference, .
Thus, a higher  implies higher cost of servicing outstanding debt, decreasing the tolerance
to cooperation versus default. This is evident by Figure 3: at levels of  above 4%, the
threshold debt-GDP ratio for cooperation versus default falls below 80%. On the contrary,
more patient creditors and domestic agents (low ), increases the cooperation range, raising
b above 160% of GDP for  less than 2%.
Figure 3 provides insights regarding the agreed interest rates of servicing debt under
EU rescue packages (Ireland, Greece, Portugal). Since rescue packages involve long-term
e¤ective interest rates, lowering the cost of debt servicing may provide more political support
in countries with corruption, by creating more incentives for rent-seeking groups to cooperate
on scal prudence. The Greek PSI program, which involved both a reduction in interest rates
and a haircut (see Ardagna and Caselli , 2014), has been followed by political consensus for
at least some time (until the elections of January 2015), providing a good example of this
insight. However, it appears that the e¤ective debt reduction achieved by the PSI was
not enough to break the non-cooperation culture in Greek politics and support a strong
commitment to scal prudence. The scal position begun to deteriorate in the summer
of 2014 after it became apparent that an election will be taking place in early 2015 and
e¤orts to enforce the consolidation program were abandoned. The January 2015 election
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was won by a populist anti-austerity left wing party (Syriza). Negotiations for a new
rescue deal commenced. The new government begun resisting and in cases reversing earlier
scal commitments, thus regressing on scal prudence, while bargaining over the terms of
scal discipline in the new deal and insisting on additional debt reduction from EU partners.
Negotiations have stalled several times and a referendum was called to take place in June
26 2015, asking the public to vote yes/no to a nancial deal o¤ered by EU partners. Greece,
around the June/July 2015 irted with the Graccident, after it became obvious that no
nancial assistance (with a promise for future debt reduction) would be extended by EU
partners unless the deal on nancial assistance was agreed and voted in favour by all political
parties of the Greek parliament.
4. Conclusion
The EU sovereign debt crisis has painfully reminded that sustainability of debt-to-GDP
ratios is of rst order importance for the stability and future course of the monetary union.
Rescue packages were introduced for EU periphery countries. One crucial element and a
challenge behind these packages, stressed by o¢ cial creditors, is the need for cooperation of
political parties, in order to achieve scal prudence. But EU periphery politics are plagued
by rent-seeking activities that overstretch scal budgets.
Our model studied the politics of coalition-making among rent-seeking groups, providing
a key insight. Reaching a high level of external sovereign debt-GDP ratio takes an economy
beyond the perils of mere economic accounting. Beyond some debt-GDP ratio threshold
which depends on the inuence of rent-seeking groups in policymaking, political resistance
to cooperation among rent seekers and parties on prudent policies arises. International
markets respond by charging high interest rates, worsening the debt dynamics and making
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default immediately preferable (and unavoidable) by rent seekers. Rent seekers do not want
to service a high outstanding debt, yet their noncooperation triggers the vicious circle of
rapidly worsening terms of borrowing. For economies which are prone to corruption and
rent-seeking phenomena, the risk of political turmoil makes the requirement of staying within
a safety zone of low debt-GDP ratio tighter.
In our framework of dynamic policy setting, debt, public consumption, tax rates, and
importantly, the free decision of rent-seeking groups to cooperate or not, are all determined
recursively, and as functions of outstanding sovereign debt. These modeling features help us
to understand what determines cuto¤ debt-GDP ratios which lead to political turmoil and
default. The mechanism triggering a vicious circle of default is a commons problem that leads
to a discrepancy between the rate of time preference of creditors and the collective rate of time
preference of governments that have multiple noncooperating rent-seeking groups. While
commons problems are di¢ cult to resolve, our model points at the importance of keeping
debt-GDP ratios low. The role of debt-GDP ratios should prevail in future extensions of our
model (e.g., with uncertainty and productive capital) which should be easy to accommodate,
given the recursive structure of the dynamic game we have suggested. Such extensions
would contribute to a project of developing sovereign-default-risk indicators for countries
as a function of their corruption fundamentals and debt-GDP ratios. These indicators can
arguably be a valuable core input for public institutions (IMF, World Bank, Eurogroup) and
private institutions that interact in sovereign debt markets.
Our model suggests that rescue packages may use short-term tools, such as debt haircuts,
or provision of low interest rates in order to convince rent-seeking groups to cooperate and
to service a debt that costs less. Yet, the long-term goal of rescue packages should be to
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promote monitoring on reforms that are likely to eradicate rent-seeking groups.
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  Appendix A – Explicit IMF reference to the need for cooperation among political parties on austerity measures 
   Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Ireland 
2012 
IMF Country Report No. 12/57 “staff 
welcomes the commitments from the 
political parties supporting the present 
coalition to continue with the objectives 
and policies of the new program”  (IMF 
2012a, p. 44) 
 
“Structural reforms, which are critical 
to addressing both of these problems, 
lost considerable momentum during 
2011. [ ...] Retaining broad political 
support for reforms will be crucial to 
future success.”  (IMF 2012a, p. 42) 
 
2012 Article IV Consultation with 
Italy- Concluding Statement of 
the IMF Mission: “ With broad 
political support, the authorities 
have embarked on an ambitious 
and wide-ranging agenda that 
has lifted Italy from the brink and 
is now seen as a model for fiscal 
stabilization and growth-
enhancing reforms”.  (IMF 
2012e, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 12/77 “Prospects of 
program success remain reasonably strong, 
given that substantial adjustment and 
significant reforms is already underway and 
there is strong political support”.  (IMF 
2012b, p. 26) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 12/179: “Finally, one 
year into the program, the authorities are 
building a convincing track record of meeting 
adjustment and reform objectives while 
preserving political support, and prospects of 
success for the program remain reasonably 
strong”. (IMF 2012c, pp.19-20) 
 
Transcript of the Updates to 
the World Economic 
Outlook/Global Stability 
Report/Fiscal Monitor Press 
Briefing 01.2012 “Political 
agreement is also needed on 
a medium-term fiscal 
adjustment plan that will first 
stabilize and then bring down 
the debt-to-GDP ratio”. (IMF 
2012f, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 12/264 “Political 
commitment to consolidation has been a welcome 
constant, as reflected in the affirmation by the 
new government (which took office in March 2011) 
of the medium-term fiscal targets in the EU–IMF 
supported program agreed in December 2010”. 
(IMF 2012d, p. 20) 
2011 
 
IMF Country Report No. 11/351: “Staff 
welcomes the creation of a national unity 
government in Greece and the 
endorsement of program objectives and 
policies by the three major political 
parties. The previous lack of broad 
political support for the program in 
Greece has emboldened vested interests 
and has thus contributed directly to the 
slowdown of reform implementation.” 
(IMF 2011f, p. 35) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/173: 
“The authorities’ welcome 
commitment to reduce the fiscal 
deficit to close to zero 
by 2014 needs to be 
accompanied by action. [...]  
The large size of the envisaged 
fiscal retrenchment requires 
structural changes which must 
be designed well in advance. 
This calls for a strong political 
consensus and careful 
planning”.  (IMF 2011c, p. 30) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/279: “Sustained 
social and political support is necessary for 
the comprehensive structural reform 
program. Strong vested interests could 
weaken reforms, or reform fatigue could 
set in, and weaken growth prospects and the 
required adjustment in the economy”. (IMF 
2011e, p. 16) 
IMF Country Report No. 
11/215: “Ambitious fiscal 
consolidation is underway but 
[...] Such a comprehensive 
strategy would be helped by 
broad political and social 
support”. (IMF 2011d, p. 1) 
IMF Country Report No. 11/109: ”the elections 
brought in a coalition government with strong 
ownership of the goals and key elements of the 
EU/IMF-supported program, much reducing these 
risks compared with the time of program approval. 
Yet the capacity to sustain fiscal adjustment and 
other reforms will depend on signs of concrete 
results in time”. [ ...] It is welcome that the new 
government has affirmed their strong commitment to 
the fiscal consolidation agreed in the EU/IMF-
supported program”. (IMF 2011b, pp. 22-23) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 11/47: “Turning market 
sentiment to a more positive tone will require 
sustained implementation and reduced political 
uncertainty”. (IMF 2011a, p. 7) 
 
2010 
IMF Country Report No. 10/110: “The 
large multiyear fiscal and structural 
adjustment requires a decisive break 
from past behavior. Greece has run into 
fiscal problems before, which were often 
resolved only temporarily and by stop-
gap measures. A decisive break now 
requires strong political will and public 
support. Mitigating factors include a 
strong mandate of the governing party 
and measures in the program to protect 
vulnerable groups.”  (IMF 2010b, p. 21) 
 
”The challenge ahead will be to 
implement the program rigorously, while 
securing the necessary public consensus 
for reforms.”  (IMF 2010b, pp. 138-9) 
 
 IMF Country Report No. 10/18: “Political 
support for reform may need broadening. 
The Socialist Party was re-elected in 
September 2009, but lost its overall majority. 
While there seems consensus 
among the main parties to comply with the 
SGP in general, pressure for further stimulus 
is strong”.  (IMF 2010a, p. 9) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 
10/254: “Policies and staff 
views: Ambitious fiscal 
consolidation is underway. [...] 
Such a comprehensive 
strategy, especially with broad 
political and social support, 
would underpin investor 
confidence, and time is of the 
essence”.   (IMF 2010c, p. 1) 
 
IMF Country Report No. 10/366: “Adhering to the 
fiscal targets and restructuring the financial sector 
require strong political will and public support”.   
(IMF 2010d, p. 12) 
 
5. Appendix B Proofs and formal denitions
5.1 Denitions and proofs of Section 2.4
As explained in the text, scal policy is set ( t; Gt; Bt+1) residually by rent-seeking groups
that co-determine CRj;t for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng. In this section,

CRj;t
	N
j=1
is determined non-
cooperatively, with each group maximizing the groups utility, subject to the rent-seeking
behavior of other rent-seeking groups (we will introduce the possibility of cooperation in a
later section). We focus on time-consistent (Markovian) policies and rent-extraction strate-
gies. For an exogenous stream of international-market interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, the Bellman
equation of rent-seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng is given by,
V^ j

Bt; zt j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+1

= max
( t;CRj;t;Bt+1)
8><>:l ln (1  L) + ln (zt) + ln (1   t)
+G ln
264 Bt+1
1 + rt+1
 
0B@Bt + !jCRj;t + NX
i=1
i6=j
!iCRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1
   tYt
1CA
375
+R ln
 
CRj;t

+ V^ j

Bt+1; (1 + ) zt j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+2
9>=>; , (37)
in whichCRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

is the Markov-Perfect rent-extraction strategy of rent-seeking
group i 2 f1; :::; Ng.
Denition B.1 Given a stream of interest rates, frsg1s=t+1, a (Markov-Perfect)
Domestic Equilibrium under No Cooperation (DENC) is a set of strategies,

Ci;R
	N
i=1
of the form CRi;t = CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

and a set of policy decision rules fT;Bg
of the form  t = T
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

and Bt+1 = B
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

, such
that each and every rent seeking group j 2 f1; :::; Ng maximizes (37) subject to
fT;Bg, and CRi 	i6=j.
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Proposition B.1 For all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, given a stream of interest rates,
frsg1s=t+1, there exists a symmetric DENC given by,
Gt
Yt
=
(1  ) G
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R
26664 ztW
 frsg1s=t+1
Yt| {z }
Economys worth/GDP
  Bt
Yt|{z}
Fiscal debt/GDP
37775 ,
(38)
while
 t = T
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= 1  1
G
Gt
Yt
, (39)
CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

=
1
!i
CR
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

=
=
1
!i
 (1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R 

ztW
 frsg1s=t+1 Bt| {z }
Economys net worth
, (40)
for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng, while,
Bt+1
Yt+1
=
B
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

Yt+1
=
=
1 + rt+1
1 + 
"
N
Bt
Yt
+ (1  N)
ztW
 frsg1s=t+1
Yt
  1
#
. (41)
Proof The rst-order conditions of the Bellman-equation problem given by (37) lead
to,
Gt = G  (1   t)  zt  L , (42)
CRj;t =
R
G  !jGt =
R
!j
 (1   t)  zt  L , (43)
and
R
!j (1 + rt+1)CRj;t
=  
@V^ j

Bt+1; zt+1 j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+2

@Bt+1
, (44)
together with the scal-budget constraint (11).
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In order to identify the value function of the Bellman equation given by (37), its associated
rent-seeking strategies, and the models decision rules, we make two guesses. We rst take
a guess on the functional form of the rent-seeking group consumption strategies, CRi;t =
CR;i
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

. Specically,
CRi
 
Bt; zt j frsg1s=t+1

= R;i  (ztWt+1  Bt) , for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng , (45)
in which R;i is an undetermined coe¢ cient, and,
Wt+1 W
 frsg1s=t+1 ,
for notational simplicity, in which W
 frsg1s=t+1 is given by the expression in (20). It can
be veried that the expression in (20) is the solution to the di¤erence equation
Wt+1 =
1 + 
1 + rt+1
Wt+2 + L ; t = 0; 1; ::: , (46)
which is a recursion fully characterizing Wt+1 in the guess given by (45). The second guess
is on the functional form of the value function of player j 2 f1; :::; Ng, in Bellman equation
(37). Specically,
V^ j

Bt; zt j

CRi
	N
i=1
i6=j
; frsg1s=t+1

= j +  j 
1X
s=t
s t ln (1 + rs+1) + j  ln (ztWt+1  Bt) ,
(47)
in which j,  j, and j, are undetermined coe¢ cients, j 2 f1; :::; Ng.
We substitute our guesses (45) and (47) into the Bellman equation given by (37), in order
to verify whether the functional forms given by (45) and (47) are indeed correct, and also
in order to calculate the undetermined coe¢ cients j,  j, j, and R;j. Before making this
substitution, a simplifying step is to use a state-variable transformation, namely,
xt  ztWt+1  Bt ,
40
and to calculate the law of motion of xt, a function xt+1 = X (xt), that is based on (11), the
rst-order conditions (42) through (47), and our guesses (45) and (47).
In order to nd the law of motion xt+1 = X (xt), we rst combine (47) with (44) to
obtain CRj;t = Rxt+1= [!jj (1 + rt+1)], and then we combine this result with (43), which
leads to,
(1   t)  zt  L| {z }
q
Yt
=
1
j (1 + rt+1)
xt+1 . (48)
Since (48) holds for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng, we conclude that
j = , for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng . (49)
From the scal-budget constraint (11) and the recursion given by (46) we obtain,
zt+1Wt+2  Bt+1| {z }
q
xt+1
= (1 + rt+1)
2664ztWt+1  Bt| {z }
q
xt
  (1   t)Yt  Gt   !jCRj;t  
NX
i=1
i6=j
!iC
R
i;t
3775 ,
which we combine with (42), (43), and (45), in order to get,
xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
264
0B@1  NX
i=1
i6=j
!iR;i
1CAxt   (1 + R + G) (1   t)Yt
375 . (50)
Since the choice of j 2 f1; :::; Ng is arbitrary, equation (50) implies,
NX
i=1
i6=j
!iR;i =
NX
i=1
i6=k
!iR;i , for all j; k 2 f1; :::; Ng . (51)
The linear system implied by (51) has a unique solution according to which,
!iR;i = R , for all i 2 f1; :::; Ng . (52)
Combining (50) with (52) gives,
xt+1 = (1 + rt+1) f[1  (N   1) R]xt   (1 + R + G) (1   t)Ytg . (53)
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After combining (53) with (48) and (49), we obtain the law of motion xt+1 = X (xt), namely,
xt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1 + 1+R+G

[1  (N   1) R]xt . (54)
With (54) at hand we return to calculating the undetermined coe¢ cients j,  j, , and
R. We substitute (47) into the Bellman equation given by (37) and get,
j +  j 
1X
s=t
s t ln (1 + rs+1) +   ln (xt) = l ln (1  L) + ln (L)
+ ln (1   t) + ln (zt) + G ln (Gt) + R ln
 
CRj;t

+ j +  j 
1X
s=t+1
s t 1 ln (1 + rs+1) +  ln (xt+1) . (55)
After combining (42), (43), and (48) with (54), we obtain,
l ln (1  L) + ln (L) + ln (1   t) + ln (zt) + G ln (Gt) + R ln
 
CRj;t

= l ln (1  L)  R ln (!j) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)  (1 + G + R)

ln () + ln ()
+ ln

1 +
1 + G + R


+ (1 + G + R) fln [1  (N   1) R] + ln (xt)g . (56)
In addition, equation (54) implies,
 ln (xt+1) =  ln (1 + rt+1)+

ln [1  (N   1) R] + ln (xt)  ln

1 +
1 + G + R


.
(57)
Substituting (57), (43), and (56) into (55), leads to,
(1  ) j = l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)  (1 + G + R) ln ()
+ (1 + G + R + )

ln [1  (N   1) R]  ln

1 +
1 + G + R


  R ln (!j)
+
 
    j

ln (1 + rt+1) + [1 + G + R    (1  )] ln (xt) . (58)
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In order that the guessed functional forms given by (45) and (47) be indeed correct, equation
(58) should not depend on its two variables, xt and rt+1. Due to this requirement of non-
dependence of equation (58) on xt and rt+1, two immediate implications of (58) are,
 =
1 + G + R
1   , (59)
and  j = , so, based on (59), we obtain,
 j =  =
  (1 + G + R)
1   , for all j 2 f1; :::; Ng . (60)
Combining (48), (54), (42), and (59), we obtain,
Gt =
(1  ) G [1  (N   1) R]
1 + G + R
xt . (61)
Equations (61) and (43) imply,
!jC
R
j;t =
(1  ) R [1  (N   1) R]
1 + G + R
xt . (62)
Our guess (45) concerning the exploitation strategy of group j 2 f1; :::; Ng is CRj;t = R;jxt.
So, combining (45) with (62) and (52) identies the undetermined coe¢ cient R,
R =
(1  ) R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R , (63)
which proves equation (40). Based on (63),
1  (N   1) R =
1 + G + R
1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R . (64)
Combining (61) and (63) proves equation (38). In addition, the budget-constraint equation
(41) is reconrmed by substituting (61) and (62) into (11), and after noticing that,
N   [1  (N   1) R] ,
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which proves formula (21). Equation (39) is proved directly from (42). Finally, after com-
bining (58) with (59), (60), (63), and (64), we can identify the last undetermined coe¢ cient,
j, which is given by,
j =
1
1  
8><>: R ln (!j) + l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R)


1   ln () + ln (1  ) +

1   ln (1 + G + R)

 1 + G + R
1   ln [1 + G + R + (N   1) (1  ) R]
9>=>; , (65)
completing the proof. 
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Since all other debtor countries are on an IEC path, the statement of this proposition
states that all debt-GDP ratios will be constant, which we will re-conrm by proving the
proposition. Equations (17) implies that mt+1 = mt for all t, so (18) becomes,
Bi;t+1 =  (1 + rt+1)B

i;t . (66)
Interest-rate levels are determined by equating demand and supply of government bonds in
international markets. In particular, the demand for bonds one period ahead, Bt+1, is given
by equation (66). Bond supply is obtained by combining the optimal level of government
spending with the scal-budget constraint. From equations (41) and (21) for N = 1 we know
that the supply of bonds in period t+ 1 is given by,
Bt+1 =  (1 + rt+1)Bt + (1 + rt+1)

(1  ) ztW
 frsg1s=t+1  Yt . (67)
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After applying the equilibrium condition Bt+1 = Bt+1, and assuming also that Bt = B

t (no
default in any period), equations (67) and (66) imply,
W
 frsg1s=t+1 = L1   , t = 0; 1; ::: . (68)
Previously we have mentioned an easily veriable result, that the sequence fWt+1g1t=0 cor-
responding to equation (20) satises the recursion given by (46). Specically, the formula
given by (20) is the solution to (46). After substituting (68) into (46), we obtain the level
of interest rate rss given by (25), and the implication that rt+1 = rss for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
Equations (26), (27), and (28) are derived immediately after substituting rt+1 = rss for
all t 2 f0; 1; :::g into (41), (38), (39), and (40). In all cases we take into account that, under
cooperation, N = . Under cooperation, all formulas are considered as if N = 1 with the
sole exception that the aggregate rents of the coalition are equally shared among rent-seeking
groups, with each rent-seeking group member receiving CR;C (Bt; zt) =N . 
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Equating demand for bonds (equation (66)) and supply of bonds (equation (41)), together
with (10), leads to,
(   N) bt = (1  N)

Wt+1
L
  1
1  N

. (69)
From (46) it is,
Wt+2
L
=
1 + rt+1
1 + 

Wt+1
L
  1

. (70)
After considering equation (69) one period ahead and after substituting (70) into it, we
obtain,
(   N) bt+1 = (1  N)
1 + rt+1
1 + 

Wt+1
L
  1

  1 . (71)
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After some algebra, equation (69) gives,
Wt+1
L
  1 = 1
1  N
[(   N) bt + N ] . (72)
Substituting (72) into (71) gives,
(   N) bt+1 =
1 + rt+1
1 + 
[(   N) bt + N ]  1 . (73)
Equation (41) can be expressed as,
bt+1 =
 (1 + rt+1)
1 + 
bt , for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g . (74)
Substituting (74) into (73) gives two useful equations, a linear rst-order di¤erence equation
in variable 1=bt,
1
bt+1
=
N

 1
bt
+ (1  )

1  N


, (75)
and an equilibrium condition that links up bt directly with rt,
[(1  ) (   N) bt + N ]
1 + rt+1
1 + 
= 1 . (76)
The solution to (75) is,
1
bt
  (1  ) =

N

t 
1
b0
  (1  )

. (77)
Combining (76) and (77) leads to,
1
1 + ~rt+1
=
   N
1 +

N

t 
1
1   1b0   1
 + N , t = 0; 1; ::: , (78)
in which f~rsg1s=1 is the sequence of international-equilibrium interest rates.
With equation (78) at hand we can identify which b0 is possible or admissible, through
equating supply and demand for bonds in period 0. Recall from equation (20) that,
W1
L
=
W (f~rsg1s=1)
L
=
1Y
s=1
1
1 + ~rs
+ 1 +
1X
s=1
1
sQ
j=1
(1 + ~rj)
. (79)
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A direct implication of equation (78) is that limt!1 ~rt = (1  ) =, and consequently,
1Y
s=1
1
1 + ~rs
= 0 , (80)
which is the rst term of the right-hand side of (79). In particular, after incorporating (80)
and (78) into (79) we obtain,
W (f~rsg1s=1)
L
=
1
1  N
+
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1b0   1
  F (b0) . (81)
In order to understand whether an equilibrium with default is possible in the case
of N  2, we examine which values of b0 are possible after equating supply with demand
for bonds in period 0. This market-clearing condition is obtained by substituting (81) into
equation (69), after setting t = 0 for the latter, which gives, (   N) b0 = (1  N)F (b0) 1,
or,
H (b0)     N
1  N
b0 +
1
1  N
= F (b0) . (82)
In order to nd solutions of (82) that reect bond-market clearing in period 0, it is helpful
to understand some properties of function F (b0). Let
f (b0; j)     N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1b0   1
 . (83)
From (83) and (81),
F (b0) =
1
1  N
+
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
f (b0; j) > 0 , for all b0 2

0;
1
1  

. (84)
Since, for all b0 2 [0; 1= (1  )],
fb0 (b0; j) =
 N
1 

N

j 1

1 

N

j 1
b0 +
1
1 

N

j 12 > 0 , (85)
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an implication of (84) and (85) is,
F 0 (b0) = fb0 (b0; 1) +
1X
s=2
sX
j=1
fb0 (b0; j)
sY
l=1
l6=j
f (b0; l) > 0 . (86)
In addition,
F (0) =
1
1  N
= H (0) , (87)
since f (0; j) = 0 for all j 2 f1; 2; :::g,
F 0 (0) = (1  ) (   N) <
   N
1  N
= H 0 (0) , (88)
and
F

1
1  

=
1
1  N
+
   N
1  (   N)
<
1
1   = H

1
1  

. (89)
Equations (86), (87), (88), and (89) show that, as b0 spans the interval [0; 1= (1  )], (i)
function F (b0) starts from taking the value 1= (1  N), and satisfying the market-clearing
condition at b0 = 0, (ii) it continues in the neighborhood of b0 = 0 with slope which is lower
than the constant slope of H (b0), (F 0 (0) < H 0 (0)), meaning that F (b0) goes below function
H (b0) in the neighborhood of b0 = 0, (iii) F (b0) continues as a strictly increasing function
all the way up to 1= (1  ), and (iv) then at 1= (1  ), F (1= (1  )) < H (1= (1  )).
Investigating concavity/convexity properties of F (b0) is a cumbersome task with, perhaps
ambiguous results. Properties (i)-(iv) regarding the behavior of F (b0), reveal that, if F (b0)
was either globally concave or globally convex on the interval [0; 1= (1  )], then it would
be immediately proved that b0 = 0 (full default) would be the only value satisfying the
market-clearing condition F (b0) = H (b0). Since we do not have such a result at hand, we
prove that no solutions other than default are possible, proceeding by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists some ~b0 2 (0; 1= (1  )), such that,
F

~b0

= H

~b0

. (90)
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From (75) we know that,
~b1 =
1
N

1
~b0
+ 
=
~b0

, (91)
in which   (   N) (1  ) = and   N= + ~b0. Since ~b1 is on the equilibrium path,
it should also satisfy,
F

~b1

= H

~b1

. (92)
From (82) and (91) it is,
H

~b1

=
1

   N
1  N
~b0 +
1
1  N
,
and by substituting (91) into this last expression again, we obtain
H

~b1

  1
1  N
=
1


H

~b0

  1
1  N

=
1


F

~b0

  1
1  N

= F

~b1

  1
1  N
,
(93)
an implication of (90) and (92). From (81) it is,
F

~b1

  1
1  N
=
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 ,
and (93) implies,
1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 = 1

1X
s=1
sY
j=1
   N
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1
 . (94)
Subtracting the right-hand-side of (94) from the left-hand side and rearranging terms,
1X
s=1
(   N)s
  1

sY
j=1
264 1
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
   1
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1

375 = 0 ,
or,
  1

1X
s=1
(   N)s (1  )s
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
sY
j=1

N

j 1
1
1 
1
~b0
1 +

N

j 1 
 1
1   1~b0   1
 
1 +

N

j 1 
1
1   1~b0   1
 = 0 . (95)
From (91) we know that
 =
~b0
~b1
, (96)
and from (74) it is,
~b0
~b1
=
1

1
1 + ~r1
. (97)
Yet, it is veriable from (78) that for all ~b0 < 1= (1  ),
~r1 > ~r
ss , 1

1
1 + ~r1
<
1

1
1 + ~rss
= 1 . (98)
Combining (98) with (97) and (96) implies,
0 <  < 1 . (99)
Inequality (99) implies that the left-hand side of (95) is the product of a negative term,
(  1) =, and an innite summation of strictly positive terms, contradicting (95). Since
the choice of ~b0 2 (0; 1= (1  )) was arbitrary, the possibility that N  2 and positive
outstanding scal debt is ruled out.
Therefore, b0 = 0 is the only admissible solution. To see that b0 = 0 is admissible, notice
that (74) implies bt = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, so F (bt = 0) = H (bt = 0) is always satised.
To sum up, if N  2, domestic governments will default. After the default, all future
governments will optimally cease the issuing of public decit. This optimal behavior in our
model is demonstrated by equation (74). 
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
In order to calculate V C;j (Bt; zt) we substitute the results stated previously into the Bellman
equation given by (24), after taking into account that the total rents of the coalition are
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divided by 2, which implies that we must subtract R ln (2) = (1  ). We have already
achieved most of this calculation as we have obtained the expressions for ,  , and  (c.f.
equations (65), (60), and (59), which correspond to the value function given by (47)). From
equation (25) in Proposition 1 we know that Wt=L = 1= (1  ) for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, so
V C;j (Bt; zt) becomes,
V C;j (Bt; zt) =
1
1  
(
 R ln (2) + l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R)

 ln (1 + )
1   + ln (1  )  ln (1 + G + R)

+(1 + G + R) ln

ztL
1    Bt

. (100)
In order to calculate V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
we nd the static-equilibrium non-
cooperative solution for N = 2, and calculate the discounted sum of lifetime utility of each
group. So,
V NC;j
 
Bt = 0; zt j
n
CR;NCi
o2
i=1
i6=j
!
=
1
1  
(
l ln (1  L) + G ln (G) + R ln (R)
+ (1 + G + R) [ln (L)  ln (1 + G + 2R)]
+ (1 + G + R)

 ln (1 + )
1   + ln (zt)

. (101)
Comparing (100) with (101) leads to the cuto¤ debt-GDP ratio in (33).
In order to verify that the cases in which (i) the two rent-seeking groups never cooperate,
(ii) the two rent-seeking groups cooperate forever, are both Markov-Perfect-Cooperation-
Decision Nash Equilibrium (MPCDNE), notice that, by denition 1, (i) can be a MPCDNE,
no matter what bt might be. From Proposition 2 we know that if rent-seeking groups never
cooperate, then bt = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, which still allows (i) to be an MPCDNE. To see
that (ii) is also an MPCDNE, notice that, as long as (33) holds in period 0, then Proposition
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3 (c.f. eq. 26) implies bt = b0, so (33) holds for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g. So, rent-seeking groups
cooperating forever is an MPCDNE, as a direct consequence of Denition 1. 
5.5 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to derive b, notice that
gNCdefault =
G
1 + G + 2R
=

1 + 
G
R
, (102)
and that (27) implies,
gC
b^
=
G
R

h
1  (1  ) b^
i
. (103)
Comparing (102) with (103) gives,
gC
b^
 gNCdefault , b^ 
1
1  

1 + 
,
proving (34), (35), and (36). To show that b > b, use (34) and (33),
b > b, 2 > 1 ,
which is a true statement, proving the proposition. 
5.6 Analytical results about calibration
Here we prove that calibrating R and G in order to match target values for the government-
consumption-GDP ratio and the total-rents-GDP ratio is independent from the values of 
at the cuto¤ level b. Let g denote the government-consumption-GDP ratio G=Y at the
cuto¤ debt-GDP b, and let cR denote the total-rents-GDP ratio at the cuto¤ debt-GDP b.
Substituting the formula given by (33) for b into (27), we obtain,
g =
G
R
 [1  (1  ) b] = G
R
2
1 + 
, (104)
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in which  is given by (32). Equation (28) implies,
cR
g
=
R
G
) G = R
g
cR
. (105)
Using (105), we can express (104) as a function of parameter R alone, obtaining,
g =
R
g
cR
1 + R(1 +
g
cR
)
2
R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
1 + R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
. (106)
Using (106) together with target calibration values for g and cR, we can nd the specic
value of parameter R by solving the nonlinear equation
f (R) = 0 ,
in which
f (R) 
R
g
cR
1 + R(1 +
g
cR
)
2
R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
1 + R
1+R(1+
g
cR
)
  g . (107)
From (107) we can see that matching target calibration values for g and cR is independent
from values of . Finally, from (105), G = 

Rg=cR. 
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Figure 1 Correlation between the fiscal-surplus/GDP ratio (in percentage points) and the Corruption-Perceptions Index (CPI) for Euro zone
countries (t-statistics in parentheses). For Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia averages are calculated since four years prior to
joining the Euro zone. Sources: Eurostat, Transparency International.
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Figure 2  The white and black regions defined by b in the deterministic version of the model in which 
changes in the debt‐GDP ratios occur as once‐and‐for‐all sunspot shocks. Stochastic versions 
of the model with anticipated shocks will introduce grey zones of default affected by politics.
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Corruption and External Sovereign 
Debt Inter-linkages in Eurozone 
Countries  
 
Figure S.1 depicts the evolution of external sovereign debt in years 2003, 2006, and 2009, a 
year before the sovereign-debt crisis broke out in the Eurozone. Figure S.1 corroborates that, 
perhaps due to the currency union, Eurozone countries continued to issue external debt, as 
the Eurozone banking system facilitated the exchange of sovereign bonds among Eurozone 
commercial banks. 
That commercial banks had incentives to buy sovereign bonds of periphery Eurozone 
countries is corroborated by Figure S.2.  Figure S.2 depicts the evolution of 10-year sovereign-
bond returns in Eurozone-periphery countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Ireland) 
versus Germany, before the entrance to the Eurozone and after the start of the sovereign-
debt crisis. All countries that had high interest-rate spreads compared to Germany before 
entrance to the Eurozone suffer chronically from corruption, according to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index survey. Table S.1 shows that Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, have been 
scoring low according to the Corruption Perceptions Index survey throughout the years 1995-
2010. The fact that the pre-Eurozone sovereign spreads of these countries vanished rapidly 
and persistently between years 2001-2008, indicates that Eurozone creditors (including 
commercial banks) in Eurozone-core countries, bought substantial amounts of sovereign debt. 
According to Figure S.1, the external debt of Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain, rose sharply 
between years 2003-2009, and placed these countries among the top external-sovereign-debt 
issuers in the world (highest debt-GDP ratios). The key message from Figure S.2 is that 
countries with high corruption had high sovereign-debt spreads before entering the Eurozone 
and afterwards, during the sovereign-debt crisis. Ireland, which exhibits low corruption, had 
sovereign-debt problems only during the sovereign-debt crisis, most likely due to its post-
Lehman-Brothers banking crisis, which was combined with a domestic real-estate price drop. 
In brief, external sovereign debt of EU periphery countries grew rapidly in the 2000s (Figure 
S.1), speculating that commercial banks in Eurozone-core countries may have been the main 
buyer of periphery sovereign debt as indicated by dynamics of 10-year-bond returns before 
and after the introduction of the Euro (Figure S.2). Euro area commercial banks typically hold 
a diversified portfolio of government bonds of several union countries and thus can be severely 
affected by a default through losses on these bonds. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) provide 
information on Euro area commercial banks foreign debt exposures as of 2010.  
The overarching element before the introduction of the Euro and after the sovereign crisis 
broke out, distinguishing core versus periphery countries in the Eurozone, is that the latter 
countries always had more corruption (Table S.1). Although our framework does not explicitly 
model banks, we use corruption and rent seeking as the main driver of developments after the 
crisis, and we provide insights concerning the political sustainability of bailout plans. First, we 
speculate that corruption and rent seeking was responsible for having high spreads in high-
corruption EU countries before the introduction of the Euro (cheap bonds due to inflationary 
expectations). Second, we speculate that the low prices of sovereign bonds in high-corruption 
countries made these bonds attractive for arbitrage by banks in low-corruption Eurozone 
countries in the 2000s, increasing the external sovereign debt of high-corruption Eurozone 
countries dramatically. Third, since high-corruption countries held high external debt during 
the subprime crisis period, some consequences of sovereign default could be transmitted 
abroad, making the possibility of default higher, and leading bond spreads to rise dramatically 
(see Figure S.2). Yet, the risk of financial contagion in the Eurozone may be high, motivating 
bailout-package initiatives. Such a rough outline of causes and effects of the sovereign crisis 
in the Eurozone is what motivated us to focus our model on the interplay between external 
debt and corruption in order to study the political sustainability of fiscal targets set by rescue 
packages. 
 
 
References 
Bolton, P.  and O. Jeanne, (2011): "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially 
Integrated Economies," IMF Economic Review 59, 162-194. 
  
  
Figure S.1 -- Source: European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
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Figure S.2 -- Source: European Central Bank and European Commission, secondary market 
yields of government bonds with maturities close to 10 years. Numbers appearing in 
parenthesis in front of every country’s name is the ranking according to the Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 from Transparency International (higher ranking means lower 
corruption). 
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Table S.1 -- Corruption Perception Index 
 
Country  1995  1998 2003 2005 2008 2010 
Score ( Ranking ) 
Ireland  8.57 (10)  8.2 (14) 7.5 (18) 7.4 (19) 7.7 (16) 8.0 (14) 
Germany  8.14 (11)  7.9 (15) 7.7 (16) 8.2 (16) 7.9 (14) 7.9 (15) 
Spain  4.35 (24)  6.1 (23) 6.9 (23) 7.0 (23) 6.5(28) 6.1 (30) 
Portugal  5.56 (20)  6.5(22) 6.6 (25) 6.5 (26) 6.1 (32) 6.0 (32) 
Italy  2.99 (31)  4.6 (39) 5.3 (35) 5.0 (40) 4.8 (55) 3.9 (67) 
Greece  4.04 (28)  4.9 (36) 4.3 (50) 4.3 (47) 4.7 (57) 3.5 (68) 
Best‐worst score  9.55‐1.94  10‐1.4 9.7‐1.3 9.7‐1.7 9.3‐1.0 9.3‐1.1 
 
Source: Transparency International 
Note: Higher score means lower corruption and numbers appearing in parentheses next 
to each score is the country’s world-corruption raking based on the score in each particular 
year. 
 
 
